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Book Review
Nancy Sherman, Afterwar: Healing the Moral Wounds of our Soldiers, Oxford/NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-0-19-932527-6. 226 pages.
Reviewed By Nancy J. Matchett
University of Northern Colorado/Greeley, CO
Most Americans routinely thank veterans for their service nowadays, but it’s worth remembering 
that this wasn’t always the case. During the Vietnam era, for example, vets often came home to 
hostility and scorn. It’s fairly easy to explain why that hostility was misplaced: many soldiers were 
just as frustrated by US policy as their civilian peers, and all military personnel show a remarkable 
willingness to put their own lives at risk for the sake of a wider nation. So it’s a good thing that most 
people now seem to recognize this, and hence a good thing when we say “Thank you for your ser-
vice” to veterans of—and participants in—the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But are these 
expressions of gratitude good enough? 
In Afterwar, Nancy Sherman explains why the answer is “no.” It’s not that she thinks we should 
have universal conscription—at least, she is “not prepared to make that case” (1). And it’s not that 
she thinks civilian ‘thank-you’s are insincere. In fact, she thinks they are a crucial part of the moral 
healing to which she hopes to contribute with this book. But Sherman understands why veterans 
often feel resentment when they hear those words. And she suspects that feeling is frequently justi-
fied, not only as a reminder of our shared responsibility in sending men and women to war, but as 
a way in which veterans hold civilians to account for the moral injuries many soldiers experience. 
The concept of moral injury has been articulated in the psychological work of Jonathan Shay (1994; 
2002) and Brett Litz (2009), and a primary emphasis in military contexts is to distinguish it from 
the more familiar notion of post-traumatic stress disorder. The difference is typically understood 
causally: whereas PTSD ultimately derives from other people’s agency, moral injury is thought to 
derive from one’s own choices and actions, specifically in response to situations where the “right” 
thing to do would be utterly immoral in any other context. In keeping with this trend, Sherman 
traces the concept’s philosophical roots back to Bishop Butler’s Fifteen Sermons (1726), while also 
drawing on her previous work on Aristotle (1991), Kant (1997) and the Stoics (2005; 2010) to ex-
plore how soldiers’ conceptualizations of their wartime experiences can lead to an overwhelming 
sense of shame or guilt. But Sherman also draws on Greek tragedy to emphasize the ways in which 
soldiers are placed in circumstances where no action can be unequivocally identified as “right” (cf. 
Nussabum 1986, 2000). The result is a much more complex and nuanced picture than has been 
presented in the military literature to date.
Each chapter begins with a real-world vignette, and these stories collectively illustrate the “variety 
of moral injuries suffered” as well as “the variety of repair” (10). Many include harrowing accounts 
of physical injuries too, such as those of as Captain Josh Mantz, who flat-lined for fifteen minutes 
after his femoral artery was severed during a sniper attack in Iraq, yet somehow managed to escape 
traumatic brain injury and resume his platoon command a mere five months later. It is tempting 
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to assume that anyone who survived such experiences would consider himself lucky to be alive, as 
well as to think it just obvious that Mantz’s dedication to military service merits nothing but praise. 
Yet for Mantz, things are not that simple. “[I]t’s the moral injury over time that really kills people,” 
he says. “Soldiers lose their identity. They don’t understand who they are anymore …  Most people 
don’t appreciate the awful weight of that” (7). 
Throughout the book, Sherman encourages us to feel that weight. In addition to the sense of alien-
ation and isolation felt by Mantz, Sherman takes moral injuries to include:
•   surging waves of resentment felt toward civilians who give little or no thought to the number 
of lives lost during war (Ch. 2)
•   constant thoughts that one should have done more to protect the soldiers under one’s command 
(Ch. 3)
•   shame and a sense of moral betrayal felt in response to US treatment of an Iraqi civilian family 
who lost their father as “collateral damage” (Ch. 4)
•   worries that reporting evidence of sexual harassment by one’s peers is equivalent to betraying 
the military’s cause and mission (Ch. 5)
•   hounding guilt for being on legitimately earned leave during a time when fellow-soldiers were 
killed (Ch. 6)
•   crippling self-doubt after being publicly reprimanded on trumped up charges that were later 
dropped (Ch. 7)
All of these cases involve “serious experiences of inner conflict” which arise when “what one takes 
to be grievous moral transgressions … overwhelm one’s sense of goodness and humanity” (8; my 
emphasis).
Much of the book is designed to show why this overwhelming experience is in fact reasonable—or 
at least understandable—once we acknowledge the role of moral emotions in human life. Following 
Strawson (1962), Sherman contends that such emotions are best understood as reactive attitudes 
constitutive of moral responsibility. This is partly due to the way in which they contain moral judg-
ments: the emotion of gratitude, for example, is not just a warm feeling; it also contains a positive 
evaluation of another person's conduct in response to the fact that the other has benefitted oneself 
in some way. But the real significance of moral emotions stems from the ways in which they call 
self or other to account. Hence, it is reasonable for soldiers to refuse to treat civilian ‘thank-you’s 
as expressions of genuine gratitude unless there is evidence that the person uttering those words 
has some concrete awareness of the very real sacrifices the soldier has made on the civilian's behalf 
(absent such awareness, the utterance cannot express the judgment that the vet has done something 
truly admirable or praiseworthy).  Moreover, it is justified for soldiers to treat civilian ‘thank-you’s 
as insincere unless there is some sense in which the person has also said “please,” i.e., some ac-
knowledgement by the person of his or her own shared responsibility, as a member of a democracy, 
in sending US soldiers to war, as well as some evidence that the person feels obligated to do some-
thing for the soldier in return.
 Once it is understood as “a reactive anger grounded in a belief, thought or perception of being 
wrongly injured by another” (31), the resentment expressed by soldiers can be seen as an appro-
priate way for soldiers to hold all of us to account. For even though “civilians may not be liable 
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for the harms combatants face,” we are “nonetheless responsible to combatants for the harms they 
suffer in defending the nation” (38). But Sherman also worries that soldiers are often too hard on 
themselves. This is brought out in the story of Lao Panyagua (Ch. 3; cf. Ch. 7), who is gripped by 
moral anguish over the death of three soldiers under his command. Never mind that he could not 
have predicted the attack and did everything in his power to protect “his baby birds” (62). The fact 
remains that his best was not enough, and for that, he continues to hold himself to account. 
Sherman contends that repairing moral injury is not simply a matter of changing beliefs. Although 
her earlier work explored the virtues of ancient stoicism for helping soldiers survive the ordeals of 
military life (2005), here she is more critical of the ways in which a kind of Stoic “sucking up” can 
lead soldiers to distance themselves from emotions that are essential to the formation of healthy 
human relationships (cf. 2010). On the battlefield, it is perfectly appropriate to turn off generalized 
feelings of compassion and trust toward anyone who is not a fellow-soldier, and it is risky even to 
care even about one’s fellow soldiers too deeply. But “that same indifference to life and death” which 
is psychologically helpful during deployment can manifest as “indifference to social connection” 
back at home (11).  
Sherman is convinced that social connection is necessary to alleviate veterans’ moral wounds, and 
it also depends on moral emotions, including hope and trust as well as (genuine) gratitude. To trust 
others is to judge that they are willing—or at least able—to attend to one’s own needs and vulnera-
bilities, and to hold them to account for doing just that. Similarly, to place hope in others is to judge 
that they can contribute in some way to positive change for the self, as well as to ask that they do so. 
There is an important contrast here between moral emotions containing negative judgments and 
those containing more positive ones. For the former are typically based on specific beliefs about 
one’s own or another’s conduct or character (moral anguish and resentment, respectively), while 
trust is based on a more general “expectation of another’s genuine interest in your well-being or 
dignity,” and hope contains a “belief about how people ought to behave toward you” (109). Even the 
negative moral emotions invoke a sense of community, pointing out that we are all in this together 
despite the fact that one of us has let the other down, and asking for some kind of redress. But the 
more positive moral emotions are essential to moral healing since they convoke community, fixing 
our gaze on a common moral ideal, or at least on the mutual interdependency that stems from our 
common vulnerability as human beings. 
Acknowledging this sort of vulnerability and (inter) dependence does not come easily for veterans 
who have been trained to protect others and take control of situations where human life is seriously 
threatened, but on Sherman’s account it is essential for soldiers to learn to accept that this is part of 
their nature too. She has been thinking about how best to facilitate moral healing since well before 
America’s current wars began. A philosophy professor at Georgetown University with a research 
background in psychoanalysis, she also served as the inaugural Distinguished Chair in Ethics at 
the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis from 1997-99. And though she has never counseled 
soldiers in an official capacity, her writing—which frequently draws on experiences from her own 
classrooms—is evidently motivated by a desire not just to understand soldiers’ experiences, but also 
to “make the moral terrain a little less murky” for them (21). Hence the book is ultimately “a mani-
festo for how to engage in moral repair, one-on-one, with individual service members and veterans 
so that we can begin to build a new kind of integrated community” (19). 
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The one-on-one engagement Sherman has in mind is less counselor-to-client than friend, fami-
ly-member or fellow-citizen-to-soldier. Her overarching suggestion is twofold: veterans need op-
portunities to process the “hard-to-touch moral wounds of war” (4), and at the same time, to feel 
valued not just for their deeds on the battlefield but as ordinary human beings. Both require civil-
ians to be very good listeners. And the latter can only be effected via “the subtle texture of indi-
vidual engagements, in words and emotional tone and in body language and conduct, that convey 
our moral regard for each other and our responsibilities as members of a shared community” (39).
Despite her emphasis on everyday interactions, there are at least two possible lessons for philo-
sophical practitioners. The first is that philosophy should be practiced with a dose of humility. 
Recalcitrant emotions such as Panygua’s are the stuff of Greek tragedy, and like Williams (1986), 
Sherman is reluctant to describe them as wholly irrational. After all, Lalo could have made different 
choices; he is right about that even if he is also mistaken to judge his actual choices so harshly. So 
changing his thinking will not quite be enough. What he needs is to feel differently about himself, 
and attempting to argue him out of those judgments, insofar as it suggests there is something wrong 
with his thinking, has the potential to make him feel worse. 
This is connected to a second lesson, which is also the most philosophically original part of the 
book. Because she does not believe “that difficult conflicts and the emotions that express them are 
ever so completely resolved that all residue of such conflicts disappears” (101), Sherman is highly 
sympathetic to the benefits of non-judgmental or empathetic listening that is a hallmark of psycho-
therapy. (For example, she credits the enduring affection of Lalo’s wife Donna, who knows every 
harrowing detail of his wartime activities and has experienced many frightening manifestations of 
his PTSD, for Lalo’s slow but steady recovery.) But Sherman’s novel suggestion is that what people 
suffering from moral injury may need most is “self-empathy.” Like ordinary empathy, self-empathy 
would preserve the “tone and valence” of the soldier’s earlier traumatic experiences. And like other 
moral emotions, it calls out to the self with a normative expectation of response. But self-empathy 
shifts the judgment from blame for what the self was unable to do, to credit for what the self did 
do. More importantly, it allows the self to “reconstrue emotionally powerful and, in some cases, 
traumatic experiences,” and hence may lead to “a fairer and more equitable assessment of respon-
sibility” (102).
Many books relevant to philosophical practice are especially keen to differentiate philosophical 
counseling from both counseling psychology and academic philosophy. Nancy Sherman does nei-
ther of these things. Instead she draws freely on from both traditions in an effort to capture the 
post-war experience of military veterans and figure out how civilians, as well as soldiers themselves, 
can best respond to their needs. The result is an interesting and worthwhile read. 
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